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Team Analysis

Melbourne Victory Women: 2021 vs 2022 – Data Analysis

This article provides a comprehensive comparison of Melbourne Victory Women’s attacking play in the A-League Women’s season 2021-22 and 2022-23. The use of metrics and graphs will help illustrate the differences between the two seasons.

Melbourne Victory finished 4th in the regular season on the ladder in both the seasons. I have outlined 9 different metrics to compare the attacking play of the team in both seasons-

  1. Goals per 90
  2. xG per 90
  3. Shots per 90
  4. Crosses per 90
  5. Key Passes per 90
  6. Passes to final third per 90
  7. Touches in penalty area per 90
  8. Forward passes per 90
  9. Number of passes 90

In the 2021/22 season, the team scored 1.9 goals per 90 whereas in 2022/23, they scored 1.6 goals per 90. The 1.9 goals per 90 in 2021/22 were scored at an xG of 1.5 per 90, which shows that they outperformed their xG. However in 2022/23 the xG was 1.8 per 90 which is higher than the previous season but they underperformed their xG & could only score 1.6 goals per 90.

Better qualities of chances were created in front of the goal in 2022/23 The team recorded 8 draws out of their 18 matches. Those draws could have converted into wins given that if they performed better in front of the goal when presented with the chances.

Lets dive deeper into how the chances were created in season 2022/23

Melbourne Victory women is known to play a mix of possession & direct style of play. Most of the times they looked to penetrate the final third by –

  1. Find wingers 1 v 1 in the outside channels to deliver crosses into the box
  2. The attacking midfielder making a forward run from deep getting in between opposition defensive line
  3. The striker holds up the play to combine with the “10s” or gets in behind to receive a through/long pass

If we look at the numbers now, we can see that there was a massive increase in the number of crosses in the 2022/23 season. It went from being 13.5 per 90 to 16.7 per 90 which resulted in the team attempting more shots on goal (from 12.1 per 90 to 12.8 per 90).

Melbourne Victory had 52.17% possession on an average in the 2021/22 season which went down to 50.6% in the last season but if we compare the numbers of passes per game, it actually increased from 421.7 per 90 to 427.3 per 90. It showed that the team looked to move the ball a lot more than just holding it.

One major principle in possession that I noticed of the team was that they liked to circulate play side to side & always tried to find the right moment to progress the ball further up the field. Therefore, you can see in the above graph that there was a slight increase in the number of forward passes – from 159.8 per 90 in 2021/22 to 161.4 per 90.in 2022/23.

The numbers definitely show that there was a much more positive intent in their attacking play in 2022/23. They were a team that looked to always play through the lines but again which can mean nothing because it also depends on how the opposition sets up against them.

In my opinion, while in possession, the presence of Kayla Morrison & Alex Chidiac made up the spine of the team because of their ability to break lines by driving forward & playing the passes through the lines. As a result, we saw an increase in the number of passes into final third which went up from 51.4 per 90 to 54.7 per 90.

The number of key passes per 90 increased from 2.4 per 90 in 2021/22 to 2.9 per 90 in 2022/23. This was due to the presence of Beattie Goad who averaged 1.38 key passes per 90 & Alana Murphy – 1.42 key passes per 90. The team heavily relied on their vision & an eye for a killer pass when Alex Chidiac left after playing just 13 matches to go back to Racing Louisville in the NWSL.

In 2022/23 the team looked to get more players into the box (averaging 3 to 5) whenever they entered the final 3rd & having Melina Ayres available for about 14 games this season saw the number of touches in penalty area go up from 13.3 per 90 in 2021/22 to 17.2 per 90 in 2022/23. Her timing of runs to arrive into the box & hold-up play to bring other teammates into play was exceptional & made her the focal point of the team. She finished as the 2nd top scorer in the league just 2 goals behind Hannah Keane of Western United. Imagine if she were there for the 6 matches she missed out?

Conclusion

It will be really exciting to see how the team does in the 2023/24 season after signing the likes of Kurea Okino, Emily Gielnik & McKenzie Weinert to add more firepower to the final third

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Player Analysis

Albert Sambi-Lokonga at Arsenal FC – Scout Report

This scout report will provide an analysis of Lokonga’s individual talent as a player, and what he will bring to the table at Arsenal this season. In this article I have analyzed how can he fit in the tactics used by Mikel Arteta and taken out videos from his recent game vs Chelsea in the Premier League to show what he can really do.

Why was Lokonga signed?

Arsenal completed the signing of 21-year-old midfielder Albert Sambi-Lokonga from RSC Anderlecht for an initial fee of around £15million plus add-ons. Lokonga was the captain of his previous team and hence is viewed as a player who could challenge for a place in the first team this season and someone with a bright future.

Last season, Arsenal’s actions in possession were narrow and their positioning off the ball wasn’t helping in breaking through the oppositions’ pressing structures. Arsenal struggled to break through the opposition’s press and was often stuck in the central areas, unable to open the passing lanes and progress the ball efficiently.

Lokonga has been signed for what he does in possession, which is something similar to Thomas Partey. Mikel Arteta needed someone who’s confident on the ball to implement his possession-based style of play. Arteta also needed a good dribbler who can work well under pressure when in possession of the ball. Lokonga has the ability to control the tempo of the game while also constantly scanning for open spaces to keep the ball moving.

The young Belgian midfielder reads the game well, which allows him to move smartly off the ball and leads to strong decision-making on it. This will allow Arsenal to retain possession and move the ball both laterally and forward, which respectively releases pressure. He will surely help the team to bypass the opposition’s press and penetrate defensive blocks.

In possession

One of the key themes of Arsenal’s attacking play is the long diagonal switch to the players operating on the wide channels. Arteta has used both his midfielders and center backs for this in his build-up play strategies. So, it’s important that any player dropping deep from midfield possesses the ability to play long passes to the wingers or fullbacks.

When you see Lokonga play, you can notice that he has the ability to switch the play effectively. It doesn’t matter whether he’s sitting way deep in the midfield or pushed up, as is his case often when Arsenal attacked, he has shown that he has the technical ability and power to switch the play from one flank to another. The confidence of receiving the ball under pressure is something that was always lacking in Arsenal’s alternative midfield options and this is where Lokonga’s signing has helped.

In his few matches for Arsenal, Lokonga has shown moments of brightness and sharp thinking in midfield. He displays a willingness to move the ball forward, whether that be by carrying it himself or playing progressive passes. The young Belgian has also shown that he has the spatial awareness and agility to skip away from pressure and travel with the ball. Lokonga also possesses the ability to find time and space to hit attackers upfront on the run with expert precision. Against Chelsea, he played a game high 9 passes into the final third. His passes held an xT (expected threat) of 0.47 which was the highest by any Arsenal player in the match.

If you notice carefully, he always has his head up and gets good touches on the ball. He has a varied passing range with an excellent vision, which makes him adept at playing passes either on the ground or through the air into space for his teammates to latch on to. When in possession one of the most important attributes he has is composure. Lokonga can always be seen demanding the ball from his teammates as he provides them with very good passing options. His patience and ability to let the play develop rather than forcing killer passes makes him better than the other alternative midfield options at Arsenal.

As we have seen in the above video, he likes to drop deeper to either provide a passing option to the back line or the goalkeeper, which opens up passing lanes in midfield because he is inviting pressure and dragging players with him. This movement by Lokonga has acted as a pressing trigger for the opposition till now and his dribbling skills have helped him in bypassing markers and play line-breaking passes upfront.

When Arsenal has the ball

Lokonga looks like a classic centre midfielder who is always on his toes, anticipating the loose ball, ready to receive – exactly what Arsenal has lacked in other midfielders. The young Belgian is constantly scanning the pitch when his team is without possession, as well as when they have it.

Look at the video below and see how he provides a passing option to his teammates while scanning at the same time to increase his knowledge of the space around him and the positioning of everyone else on the pitch. If you look carefully, he is always positioned centrally between two opposition players, which urges other players to break lines and move the play forward.

Lokonga was always available as a passing option to his teammates but wasn’t played the ball. I think he had enough time to receive the ball to switch the play or play it forward.

We have seen the 21-year-old adapt a more box to box role at Arsenal in which he is constantly moving all over the field, using his positioning to offer quality passing options to his teammates. His spatial awareness and anticipation skills make it easy for him to break lines and play progressive forwards to help retain possession while also going forward.

Defending

Lokonga is 6ft tall and uses his large frame to execute his defensive actions, although he is not one of the most pro-active players while defending. He rarely racks up fouls and tackles when defending. He is never highly engaged in defensive duels, but he is an effective tackler who is patient as he waits for the right moment to put in a tackle and would be rated just above average when it comes to winning aerial duels. Instead, he is a player who uses his positioning and body to defend spaces on the field. Rather than diving into challenges, he relies on his anticipation skills, which would allow him to quickly react to the opposition’s movement. He is effective at using his body shape to shepherd attacks wide. The young Belgian is a promising player but defensively shows inexperience, as he also does not engage in winning second balls.  

Lokonga defended his space well as he cuts out the passing lane from Alonso to Lukaku which was the only way out of this wide trap applied by Arsenal.
Good anticipation by Lokonga here as he reached on time, which stopped Kovacic from playing forward and forced him to play back to Azpilicueta.

Lokonga has difficulty in sensing danger as he lacks defensive awareness which could prove problematic, and his recovery runs to get back into position are slow. Age is on his side and with proper coaching, he could work on these things and develop to become even better.

As Kovacic dropped deep to receive the ball, Lokonga kept on following him. Here he could have either stayed back to cover his space and stopped the pass to the more dangerous Havertz or his recovery run could have been a lot quicker to stop Havertz from starting an attack.

Conclusion

It looks like Arteta is trying to create a press resistant Arsenal that could focus on ball possession and positional play, also relying on preparation through video analysis. Lokonga’s signing is an important step in the right direction for better space exploitation and a more creative and unpredictable movement by the whole team during matches. The dynamic of Arsenal’s midfield has been too static for too long. He has the qualities to build on the arrival of Partey last summer and add vibrancy to the middle third, with much more room for him to develop. The 21-year-old midfielder has recently been called up to the Belgium squad for the World Cup qualifiers. I believe Lokonga will fit in nicely at Arsenal.

Created using: Once Video Analyzer PRO by Once Sport | https://www.once.de/once-video-analyser-pro/

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Match Analysis

A League Grand Final 2020/21: Melbourne City vs Sydney FC – tactical analysis

Venue: AAMI Park, Melbourne

Date & Time: 27 June, 5.05pm

Round No: A-League Grand Final

Attendance: 14,017

Melbourne City won their first ever A-League Championship after coming from behind to beat Sydney FC 3-1 in front of the home crowd. Both teams were without some of their best players who were away on international duty and it proved to be a great chance for youngsters like Marko Tilio, Stefan Colakovski, Nathaniel Atkinson, Joel King and Paulo Retre to make a mark. City came out really strong at home with character and attitude as they’ve shown throughout the season and were straight into its full throttle.

Sydney managed to open the scoring in the 21st minute and City equalized just after two minutes. From the 35th minute, Sydney was one man down as Luke Brattan was red carded, which turned the game into City’s favour.

This article is a tactical analysis of the game between Melbourne City and Sydney FC. I have analyzed the tactics that were used by both teams.

Line-ups

Melbourne City: 1-4-3-3 | Sydney FC: 1-4-2-2-2

Manager: Patrick Kisnorbo|Manager: Steve Corica

Patrick Kisnorbo set up his team in their usual 1-4-3-3 formation and made no changes from last match to the starting line-up. While Steve Corica also stuck to his usual formation 1-4-2-2-2 and made no changes to the starting line-up from the previous match.

Sydney out of possession vs City in possession 

This was a game of the league’s best attack (Melbourne City) vs best defence (Sydney FC). It was good to see both teams sticking to their playing style and do what they do best.

Sydney set up in a mid-block 4-2-2-2 shape while defending
in which the attacking midfielders Barbarouses and Baumjohann would tuck inside. They have conceded the least amount of goals (27 goals in 28 matches) in the whole season. Sydney is not a high pressing team as they like to stay on the edge of the middle third and allow the opposition to come out with the ball. They are ranked third-last on the number of pressures applied in the opponent’s half (15 per match at a success rate of 40%) which is below the league average (17 per match).

Sydney kept a compact mid-block structure, not allowing City to play through the middle. The strikers Bobo and Le Fondre would position centrally, cutting off any passes through the centre. Attacking midfielders, Barbarouses and Baumjohann would position themselves in the half-spaces blocking the passes out wide and would be ready to press if the centre-backs dribble with the ball forward.

Whenever City was able to progress the ball, Sydney retreated into a compact low-block. Hence, they were able to maintain their defensive compactness both horizontally and vertically. When in a low block, Sydney used a space-oriented man coverage (hybrid of zone and man marking) and if City were able to enter the coverage zone with the ball, they would quickly try to press the ball carrier. Sydney tried to force City to play wide and when this happened, the whole team would shuffle across to not allow the opposition to play through the wings.

Melbourne City looked to build-up play from the back in a
2-3-5 shape. In this tactical structure, Tilio and Atkinson were instructed to stay very wide, hugging the sideline which would pull the opposition fullbacks Retre and King out of the positions and created a bigger space in the half-spaces between Sydney’s centre-backs and full-backs. Thus, Luna and Berenguer could operate in those half-spaces and create a positional front five versus a four-man defensive line of Sydney.

When Luna and Berenguer moved up into the half-spaces, which
would leave big gaps in midfield and to cover them, Jamieson and Galloway would play as inverted fullbacks.

Initially, City found it a bit difficult as Sydney pressed with Bobo and Le Fondre against their two centre-backs. So, Galloway started operating a bit deep with the two centre-backs to create a back three which created a numerical superiority against the first line of press. Thus, Baumjohann had to follow Galloway and press higher. As you can see in the below picture,  a lot of space started opening up between Warland and King.

Thus, City’s build-up play shape switched to a 3-2-5 where in Jamieson also started playing more centrally. Then Atkinson started to operate more centrally to exploit that space between Warland and King which allowed more space for Galloway on the right flank to overlap and create a 2 v 1 against King as Baumjohann could not keep up with Galloway’s movement and speed.

The above video shows you an instance when Galloway made an overlapping run to provide a passing option to Atkinson due to which King got caught in two minds of whether to close down Atkinson or stop the pass out wide. The same instance shows you that Baumjohann was not able to keep up with Galloway and allowed him to run free.

As you can see in the below picture, City created triangles in the wide areas which involved a full-back, winger and attacking midfielder, trying to open the compact defensive block of Sydney.

All three players rotated amongst themselves and made sure all three spaces were always filled. The rotations in the wide areas helped in the progression of the ball smoothly into the middle and final third because of the poor defensive attributes of Sydney’s attacking midfielders, which led to easy penetration.

Watch the above video to get a glimpse of how City’s players rotate in the wide areas and how because of their movement they could drag all Sydney midfielders out wide to the flank which created a big gap in the centre.

Sydney in possession vs City out of possession

Melbourne City defended in a mid-block 4-2-4 shape. The wingers Atkinson and Tilio operated in the half-spaces and used their shadow to cover the Sydney full-backs. Luna joined Colakovski to lead the first line of press, positioned themselves centrally to stop Sydney to progress through the centre and force the opposition to play wide.

In possession, Sydney used a 3-1-4-2 shape in which Caceres or Brattan would drop in next to the centre-backs to form a back three, while the other would be present in front of the back three as a single pivot. The formation of a back three created more passing options for the defenders. King and Retre operated high and wide, providing the width. Barbarouses and Baumjohann were given the license to free roam and drift wide. Bobo and Le Fondre operated between the City full-backs and centre-backs, which kept them both engaged. Thus, City full-backs could not press King and Retre out wide.

Watch the above video and see how the movement of Barbarouses (drifting in from the toucline) allowed Sydney to play through City’s narrow defensive block.

Red card to Brattan

It seemed to be an interesting tactical battle until it was 1-1 and then Brattan received a second yellow card in the 35th minute, which meant that Sydney will be a man down for the remainder of the contest.

Steve Corica replaced Bobo with Van Der Saag. Retre moved into midfield with Caceres and Van Der Saag took Retre’s position. Sydney had to change their shape to a 4-2-3, it became harder for them to maintain a compact defensive block because City’s rotations in midfield and movement of midfielders in between the lines. So, City dominated the play comfortably and played through Sydney’s low defensive block easily.

Created using: InStat Australia | https://football.instatscout.com/

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Once Video Analyzer Pro by Once Sport | https://www.once.de/once-video-analyser-pro/

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Match Analysis

A League 2020/21: Melbourne City vs Macarthur FC – tactical analysis

Venue: Netstrata Jubilee Stadium, Sydney

Date & Time: 20 June, 4.05pm

Round No: A-League Semi-Final 2

Attendance: 2283

Melbourne City defeated Macarthur FC 2-0 to make it to the A-League Grand Final for a second consecutive time. It was really good to see youngsters like Stefan Colakovski and Marco Tilio step up and fire City into the Grand Final. City’s remarkable win was sealed by these young guns before the hour mark in the absence of Jamie Maclaren, Curtis Good and Connor Metcalfe.

This article is a tactical analysis of the game between Melbourne City and Macarthur FC. I have analyzed the tactics that were used by both teams.

Line-ups

Melbourne City: 1-4-3-3                        Macarthur FC: 1-4-2-3-1

Manager: Patrick Kisnorbo                   Manager: Ante Milicic

City set up in their usual 1-4-3-3 formation in which Andrew Nabbout made way for Nathaniel Atkinson as the right winger.

While Macarthur also lined up in their preferred 1-4-2-3-1 formation and made three changes. Loic Puyo replaced Moudi Najjar, Benat Etxebarria replace James Meredith and Matt Derbyshire led the attack, replacing Michael Ruhs.

Melbourne City’s build-up & attacking play vs Macarthur’s pressing & defensive organisation

Melbourne city used a positional front five versus a four-man defensive line of Macarthur. Macarthur used a four-man defensive line to cover the full width of the field which meant they would conceded more space in the wide channels or the wingers and midfielders had to work harder to cover the gaps by shuffling across.

All players were given different levels of freedom in this structure. The CBs and the lone central defensive midfielder had a fixed position. While the full backs, wingers and attacking midfielders were given the permission to rotate, keeping the shape of a wide triangle on both flanks, provided all these three spaces were always filled. The occupation of these spaces helped in the progression of ball into the middle and final third smoothly and with because of poor positioning of the opposition, it led to easy penetration.

As the players within the triangle were free to rotate, each of them occupied a space more regularly than the others. Marco Tillio (23) and Nathaniel Atkinson (13) were the wide wingers, Scott Galloway (2) and Scott Jamieson (3) operated as inverted fullbacks and Florin Berenguer (10) and Adrian Luna (20) played more as  high “10s” in the half spaces. City favoured the left flank more to perform this wide rotation as 48% of the attacks came from that flank while only 35% of the attacks came from the opposite flank.

City players were always positioned well and ready to do damage throughout the width of the field, as they always looked to attack the spaces left open by the opposition. For the larger proportion of the game, City were attempting to score against a deep and packed defence.

Macarthur pressed in a mid to high block 4-2-3-1 structure. As City looked to play through the flanks to progress into the final third, Macarthur would shift across to overload the flank, forcing City to go back or go long. The Macarthur defensive midfielders (29 & 4) used their shadow to cover the attacking midfielders (20 & 10) of City. Often, Puyo (10) joined the press with Matt Derbyshire (27) to stop the switch of play and used his shadow to cover Aiden O’Neill (8).

Macarthur overloaded the flank pretty well (by shuffling across) through which the attack would be initiated by City but this would also mean City players were left unmarked on the opposite flank, giving an opportunity to switch the play to the underloaded side. City started switching the ball more, which forced Macarthur to sit back rather than pressing high and shuffling from side to side.

City exploited the space between the opposition’s defensive midfielders well. Luna and Berenguer’s movement caused problems for Macarthur in the midfield and would create space for Colakovski to drop in to receive the ball which would force the opposition’s centre-backs to make a decision of whether to step up and press or leave the gap behind open. After realising that the opposing centre-backs were not dropping, Colakovski would stay up high to create space for Luna to drag the opposition midfielder around and receive the ball facing forward.

Macarthur’s build-up & attacking play vs Melbourne City’s pressing & defensive organisation

Ante Milicic deployed a 3-4-2-1 structure while building up from the back because a structure with a back three provides a lot more angles and passing lanes, which increases the variety in which they could build up from the back. Their aim was to achieve numerical superiority in the first phase of play.

Macarthur’s build-up play was slow and patient as they looked to facilitate safe progression from the back. There were usually 7-8 players involved in the build-up play which made it very difficult for opposition to press with equal numbers thus, City had to commit a lot of players high up the pitch to press them.

Franjic (7) would tuck in on the left side next to the centre backs to form a back three. Benat and Martis operated as the double pivot in front of the three centre backs with a staggered positioning while Tommy Oar and Jake McGing provided the width acting as wingbacks. Puyo and M’Mombwa played as inside forwards in between the lines just behind Derbyshire, who led the attack for Macarthur.

To aid in the build-up play, Federici (1) would often step up and position himself next to Susnjar to form a back four. They used Federici as a sweeper keeper to keep the ball moving as he was the free player in the defensive third. This created an overload against City’s first line of press, making it easier to pass the ball forward. It helped in stretching City’s first line of press. Due to width in build-up play, it became harder for City to cover the ground horizontally and increased the distance between the opposition players while pressing. Thus, City could not be compact anymore and passing lanes for Macarthur started to open up.The method of progression they will use depends on the decisions made by the opposition.

In this way the wingbacks were able to pin the City’s full backs by being extremely high and wide due to which Franjic and Milligan enjoyed time and space while in possession. Thus, 70% of the attacks for Macarthur came from the flanks.

City defended in a mid-block 4-4-2 shape, waiting for the opposition on the edge of the middle third. Luna joined the press with Colakovski, positioning centrally to cut off any progression through the centre. Tillio and Atkinson operated in the half-spaces to stop the wide play and were ready to press the opposition if the first line of press was beaten. The aim was always to block the central areas and force Macarthur to play wide. Whenever it happened, City would shuffle across and press aggressively to force a mistake from the opposition.

If Macarthur were able to progress the ball, then City would retreat into a lower block, keeping defensive compactness both horizontally and vertically. City players would be at a very short distance to each other, reducing passing lanes, which gave more opportunities to press the ball carrier aggressively. They applied a space-oriented man-marking scheme which meant that they kept the compactness and players would pressure the opponents if they entered their zone with the ball.

City’s defensive transition vs Macarthur’s offensive transition

During transition from attacking to defending phase, City would look to press on the ball with one or two players while the rest of the team would move into a man-marking scheme to close down any access point the ball carrier might have. City has players who are excellent in challenging for the ball hence they forced the opposition to commit a mistake.

Macarthur always looked for the long escape pass to Derbyshire when they were transitioning from defence to offence. Derbyshire acts as the focal point of attack for Macarthur to control the ball and bring others into play.  Macarthur usually attacked with 3-4 players and the others would step up to condense the space behind them.

City’s offensive transition vs Macarthur’s defensive transition

City were lightning quick on offensive transitions and they got both the goals as a reward for it. They always looked to play the first pass out of pressure to Colakovski, Tillio, Atkinson or Luna who would make runs in behind the opposition’s defence line as they tried to create space for the others to join the attack. City took advantage of the spaces generated in between Macarthur’s defensive structure and looked for verticality. Macarthur always looked to counter press aggressively for a few seconds with one or two players in defensive transitions and the defenders would start dropping off which left big gaps in midfield.

To counter that City attacked with 4-6 players and at a quick pace as they looked to move the ball forward and diagonally. Sometimes they also tried to combine play with short passes in midfield to drag the opposition players in and then play a long pass out to one of the forwards.

Created using: InStat Australia | https://football.instatscout.com/

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Once Video Analyzer Pro by Once Sport | https://www.once.de/once-video-analyser-pro/